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A TYPICAL EXAMPLE OF PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
0
By OMAR E. GARWOOD, of the Denver Bar
RECENT case involved the purchase price of a shipment of merchandise which the consignee claimed was
so defective as to be practically worthless. The consignor claimed an acceptance at reduced price by written
memorandum signed by the consignee. Plaintiff was a nonresident and would have been compelled to travel 1,000 miles
to attend the trial. Defendant expected to call numerous
witnesses to testify to the condition of the goods. At the
pre-trial conference in the Judge's chambers the following
took place:
The trial judge: "Gentlemen: You understand that this
conference is informal and off the record. Neither of you is
obliged to consider settlement of this case. The court is here
to aid you in every way possible; the hope is entertained that
we may be able to arrive at a stipulation which will avoid the
necessity of calling witnesses or taking testimony. I now ask
each of you gentlemen to state your respective contentions."
After hearing each side and informally discussing the contentions made, the court, with consent of both counsel, dictated
the following stipulation:
"It is hereby stipulated by counsel and ordered, that the facts of
the case are agreed to be as found by the Secretary of Agriculture in the
record submitted on this appeal.
"That evidence by witnesses if produced by the defendant would
prove, if material, that on Tuesday, July 27, 1937, the peaches in
question had greatly deteriorated and were in such condition that they
could only be used for canning: that the question whether such evidence
is competent and material is submitted for decision, and that the parties
have five days from this date to submit briefs. The court shall decide
the matter upon this record."

Briefs were filed and the court made findings of fact, and
conclusions of law, and entered final judgment.
This pre-trial conference lasted forty minutes. Trial of
the case probably would have taken two days. The stipulation dictated by the judge eliminated the necessity of introducing any testimony, and by this 'means every point was established for both sides which could have been established by the
long, drawn-out process of examination and cross-examination. Any lawyer witnessing this proceeding would have
been convinced that the trend is decidedly toward pre-trial
procedure in all nisi prius courts. In the Federal Courts a very
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large percentage of cases have already been disposed of by this
method.
Detroit is the pioneer city in pre-trial procedure. Its
calendar of law cases was nearly four years behind and something had to be done to afford litigants an opportunity to get
their cases disposed of. A conciliation or settlement docket
was first set up, and this finally led to the pre-trial docket. It
has been so successful that law cases are tried with less than
a year of waiting. An average of twelve percent of all cases
are disposed of at pre-trial hearings.
Attorneys have nothing to lose by consenting to pretrial hearings, and potentially they have much to gain. Narrowing of the issues, admission of copies of documents, accelerated settlements, elimination of witnesses, dispensing with
juries, omission of stenographic records, clearing the trial
docket and a tremendous saving of time and expense are
elements that strongly appeal to clients and lawyers alike.
Much depends on the attitude and adroitness of the pre-trial
judge who sits as an impartial third person eliminating evidence and points of law by friendly agreement or stipulation
until counsel are surprised to find that there is so little left
for real controversy.
Los Angeles superior court judges have been holding
pre-trial hearings since 1937 with very gratifying results;
there is a growing tendency in all jurisdictions in the same
direction.
Pre-trial hearings seem to be much more effective and
satisfactory than proceedings before referees. The reason is
said to be largely psychological. When attorneys are confronted in chambers with an impartial judge who proceeds
to convince them that he wishes only to work out substantial
justice, the feeling of suspicion and antagonism tends to disappear and a leaning toward conciliation takes its place. The
question is sometimes asked whether all cases are to be subjected to pre-trial disposition; by no means; there will always
be a sizeable percentage of cases which must be litigated as
heretofore. It is said that justice delayed is justice denied.
Pre-trial procedure lessens the cost and quickens the final disposition of litigation. Perhaps it is paving the way to realization of the forgotten constitutional guaranty of a speedy
trial.

THE LADY WHOM A SUPREME COURT CALLED "A
NAKED PROSTITUTE"
By FRANK SWANCARA, of the Denver Bar

N Updegraph v. Com., 11 S. V R. 394, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania declared that "every debating club" permitting free speech on theological subjects "might dedicate the club-room to the worship of the Goddess of Reason,
and adore the deity in the person of a naked prostitute."
In the light of the phraseology used and the stories then
current of the French Revolution of 1789, it is certain that
the court was alluding to the leading lady in the Festival of
Reason conducted in the cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris
on November 10, 1793. The festival was the result of the
"Worship of Reason" instituted by the Convention a few
days earlier, but the ceremony had no "Goddess of Reason."
There was an impersonation of the "Goddess of Liberty."
The court's choice of words was the result of some tales originating with enemies of the French Revolution, and not to be
found in Carlyle's French Revolution. There is an old history
by Thomas Henry Dyer, LL.D., and it contains this statement:
"*

*

*

a prostitute, dressed up as the Goddess of Liberty,

came forth from the temple."

The lady was not "a naked prostitute" as the American court
implied, nor even one "dressed up" as Mr. Dyer wrote.
Consult the modern historians: Henri Martin in History
of France, writes:
'Reason, represented by Mademoiselle Maillard, a famous singer,
**

*

She wore a white robe and sky-blue mantle,

*

*

*."

Gottschalk, American writer on French history, uses
these words:
"Reason-impersonated, some say. by a street-walker, but more
probably, by the wife of Hebert's right-hand man, Momaro-was enthroned in the temple."

The last quotation is evidence that "some" have said,
and even now "some say" that the First Lady on the historic
occasion was "a street-walker." If any one was ever so sure
of the identity of the lady to know that she was "a naked
prostitute," as the American court intimates, why the disagreement among the historians as to whether she was
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Mademoiselle Maillard or Mme. Momaro? If it was one or
the other of these two, she was neither a "naked" nor a
"dressed up" courtesan, being too busy in respectable ways,
one "a famous singer," and the other the wife of an active
politician. Without naming the lady, James Harvey Robinson refers to her as "a handsome actress," Philip Van Ness
Myers says she was "a celebrated beauty," Charles Downer
Hazen describes her as "a dancer from the opera," and James
Edward Gillespie says she was an "opera singer." Carlyle
simply refers to the "Goddess Candeille."
One lone late historian does asperse the character of the
lady in question. He is William Stearns Davis, and in Europe
Since Waterloo (1926) uses this language:
"* *
* in 1793 a light woman had been encouraged as she
screamed a ribald song from the high altar of Notre Dame in Paris."

That statement aroused the indignation of Bishop William
Montgomery Brown, a scholar whom the late federal judge
Martin J. Wade characterized as "mentally defective" (58
Am. Law Rev.). The bishop was relying on the scholarship
of Prof. Aulard, as do others, regarded as compos mentis.
No woman appeared on "the high altar." In the ceremony,
an improvised "temple" was used, as Dr. Dyer indicated. The
results of the researches made by Prof. Aulard, the most reliable French historian, show that there was no "light woman," either in the temple or on an altar. No "ribald song"
was "screamed" or otherwise delivered. There was sung or
chanted an Ode to Liberty. It is quoted by Winifred Stephens
in her book, "Women of the French Revolution," and contains nothing "ribald."
The mentally sound judge of the Pennsylvania court
apparently never paused to speculate why any common prostitute, disfigured by her calling, would be selected for signal
honors in a public ceremony when, as Miss Stephens observes,
many beautiful actresses and singers of respectability were
available and willing to participate in festivals not only in
Paris but elsewhere in France. Neither did the same judge
reflect on the psychological impossibility among the Rationalists of 1789 of making a "deity" of an individual, to say
nothing of adoring "the deity in the person of a naked prostitute." A greater offender than the jurist was, of course, the
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person who invented the tale which later was given credence
by Dr. Dyer, already quoted, and by the court, also quoted.
The man who knew all about the Festival of November
10, 1793, was Jacques Rene Hebert, the French New Dealer
who described it in his newspaper, and who induced the Convention to adopt the "Worship of Reason." On March 24,
1794, his head was chopped off at the instigation of Robespierre. They had "purges" in those days, and possibly some
Huey Long was liquidated by a private assassin. Hebert did
not live to refute false tales about the Feast of Reason. His
co-worker was Pierre Gaspard Chaumette, but the latter, too,
was early executed. The Encyclopedia Brittanica says that
he was a "social reformer" who secured "the suppression of
houses of ill-fame and of obscene literature."
He would
naturally prefer some Caesar's wife to take the highest honors
at a public ceremony sponsored by himself. It is possible that
the spouse of Momaro, as Gottschalk suggests, was chosen.
Now, if any lawyer in Pennsylvania or elsewhere wishes
to request the Pennsylvania court to strike from its files, at
least figuratively, the words "a naked prostitute," as being
false, scandalous and defamatory, and as libelously reflecting
on Miss Maillard or Mrs. Momaro, this paper indicates that
material for a supporting brief is accessible.
PRICE-FIXING UNDER INTERSTATE COMMERCE POWER
Federal price-fixing, at least in the case of milk, has been upheld
by a majority of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court
did not enter upon a discussion of the vast constitutional principles
involved, or of the immeasurable economic and political consequences
to be envisaged (vide supra, pp. 125-128, 129-130, 133-134), but
merely concluded that, "The power enjoyed by the states to regulate
the prices for handling and selling commodities within their internal
commerce rests with the Congress in the commerce between the states."
Thus, since a state may regulate the price of milk sold within its borders
(Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S,. 502), it follows that the Federal
Government may regulate the price of milk sold across state lines.
(United States v. Rock Royal Co-Operative, Inc., et at., U. S. Sup.
Ct., June 5, 1939.) Justices Black and Douglas even went so far as
to assert in a separate memorandum that the federal power to enact the
statute did not depend upon the use and nature of milk. (Lawyer Serice Letter, N. Y. S., Bar Association, June 7, 1939.)

FEDERAL LEGISLATION
THE REACH OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE POWER
(Lawyer Service Letter, April 19, 1939, New York
State Bar Association)
The scope of the power of the central government over commerce has now been defined, under two of the most recent decisions of
the Supreme Court, to cover situations which in the opinion of many
lawyers were thought to be of exclusive concern to the States. It is
therefore of the greatest importance to the bar and to the public that
the implications and effects of these two decisions be promptly studied
and appraised.
One of these decisions involves the National Labor
Relations Act and the other the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.
In the former case (NLRB v. Fainblatt,U. S. Sup. Ct., April 17,
1939), the federal power under the commerce clause was held to extend
to unfair labor practices of a small "contract" clothing manufacturer
not engaged in interstate commerce but whose product was regularly
shipped in interstate commerce by the company which contracted for
such manufacture. In the latter case (Mulford v, Smith, U. S. Sup. Ct.,
April 17, 1939), the federal power was held to extend to the absolute
prohibition of interstate commerce, and a fortiori to the limitation of the
amount of a given commodity which may be transported in such commerce, whenever Congress intended to "foster, protect and conserve"
such commerce "or to prevent the flow of commerce from working harm
to the people of the nation."
The Fainblattcase aforesaid is apparently bottomed on the proposition that a labor dispute in the plant of the intrastate manufacturer
might lead to a strike and to a reduced output which in turn would curtail the interstate shipments of the distributor who had contracted for
the manufacturing. Such a strike might also result in the curtailment
of the shipment of raw materials to the manufacturer from other states.
[Ed.: The editor has done his best in analyzing thus the basis of jurisdiction as described in the majority opinion; he confesses, however, to
unusual difficulty in grasping as thoroughly as he would wish certain
of the paragraphs of the opinion.] The vast implications of this theory
of jurisdiction ought to be weighed carefully by the bar because of other
federal legislation, the validity of which has not yet beeni passed upon
by the Supreme Court, and also because of possible future legislation
in the field of commerce. That the minority of the Court (Justices
McReynolds and Butler) were greatly concerned with this holding is
evidenced by their assertion that Congress may now validly regulate
wages, hours, output, prices, etc.; that, as now construed, the power
to regulate interstate commerce "brings within the ambit of federal
control most if not all activities of the Nation; subjects states to the
will of Congress; and permits disruption of our federated system."
The concluding paragraph of the minority opinion sounds an ominous
note:
"The present decision and the reasoning offered to support
it will inevitably intensify bewilderment. The resulting curtail-
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ment of the independence reserved to the States and the tremendous
enlargement of federal power denote the serious impairment of the
very foundation of our federated system. Perhaps the change of
direction, no longer capable of concealment, will give potency to
the efforts of those who apparently hope to end a system of government found inhospitable to their ultimate designs."
The Mulford case aforesaid, upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as a valid exercise of the commerce power, is of equal
importance with the Fainblatt decision; in fact, the two would seem to
supplement each other. The same majority held in the Mulford case
that, when Congress intends at any time to prevent interstate commerce
from "working harm to the people of the nation," the shipment across
state lines of any product of any nature whatsoever may be entirely
prohibited. Hitherto, in cases of prohibition of commerce the nature
of the commerce has been a controlling factor. Thus, lottery tickets
(Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321), adulterated food (Hipolite Egg
Co. v.United States, 220 U. S. 45), "white slaves" (Hoke v. United
States, 227 U. S. 308), stolen automobiles (Brooks v. United States,
267 U. S. 432), and kidnapped persons (Gooch v.United States, 297
U. S. 124) have been held subjects of forbidden commerce. Hitherto,
the Supreme Court had stated that the power to prohibit the interstate
shipment of lottery tickets did not extend to "pig iron, steel rails, or
most of the vast body of commodities" Wilson v.New, 243 U. S. 332,
346). This doctrine has now been superseded by the Mulford case.
To be sure, the Mulford case involved the shipment of tobacco, which
is considered by some as a harmful commodity, but the Court made no
point of this and travelled the whole distance.

TAXATION-DOUBLE TAXATION
Decedent, while a resident of Colorado, created a trust consisting
of federal, state, and other bonds. The trustee was a Denver bank.
Thereafter the settlor moved to New York, where she died. An inheritance tax upon the trust res in Colorado was imposed by that State.
When New York also sought to collect death taxes based upon the
trust property, the Court of Appeals held that New York could not
tax. Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States,
reversed. In a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, concurred
in by Mr. Justice McReynolds, Mr. Justice Butler, and Mr. Justice
Roberts, it was stated that: "I think that the decision in this case
pushes the fiction of mobilia sequuntur personam to an unwarranted
extreme and thus unnecessariily produces an unjust result."
(Graves v.
Elliott, U. S. Sup. Ct., May 29, 1939.)
(Lawyer Service Letter,
N. Y. S., Bar Association, June 7, 1939.)
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HUMAN OBSOLESCENCE AND SUPERANNUATION
(Los Angeles Bar Bulletin)
It does not require a great deal of objective thinking to reach the
logical conclusion that a very large percentage of our people expect the
Government, federal, state and county, to support them permanently
regardless of the economic consequences. Nor is it difficult to foresee
that concessions to the ever-growing demand for "relief," and pensions
will slowly but inevitably eat away the very foundations of our national economic structure. More than that; the steady, glacial erosion
of individual independence and initiative is weakening those characteristics that made us a great democracy and now threatens to bring about
dire changes of government.
It must be recognized that the problem is not temporary; that it
is not due entirely to "depressions" or "recessions," but is definitely a
permanent one; that its solution demands the best collective thinking and
planning of all who would discard political considerations.
Obviously, we cannot long continue over the paths of least resistance by giving way to pressure groups, but must blaze new and rougher
roads to a sane solution. Great fundamental changes in our social and
industrial standards are moving with relentless force to increase rather
than decrease the number of persons whose demands or necessities must
be considered. Among many factors are these: Medical science has prolonged life's expectancy far beyond that of any time in recorded history,
and technological advances are displacing an ever-growing army of
workers. Thus we have the new problem of human obsolescence, added
to the old familiar problems of superannuation, that are little less than
appalling.
How long this situation can endure without a serious breakdown
in our social and economic structures is the question facing every one of
us, and demanding an intelligent answer.

DISCRIMINATORY DISCHARGES
For some time previous to the demand of a union for collective
bargaining the employer had been considering on business grounds the
abolition of the positions of four employees. Immediately after the
demand for bargaining, such positions were eliminated. The National
Labor Relations Board held that such discharges were discriminatory
and designed to hinder the union in its bargaining efforts. Although
the Board conceded that the positions were abolished for business reasons, it was convinced that the employer timed the discharges so as to
embarrass the union.
(NLRB v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., Inc.,
National Labor Relations Board, 12 N. L. R. B., No. 130, May 27,
1939.)
(Lawyer Service Letter, N. Y. S., Bar Association, June
7, 1939.)
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COLORADO BAR SPEAKERS FEATURED ON
AMERICAN BAR PROGRAM
NUMBER of Colorado attorneys are among the fea-

tured speakers at the various section meetings to be
held in conjunction with the annual convention of the
American Bar Association at San Francisco on June 10th to
14th. Among those listed in the advance program of the
Association, as speakers, are William R. Kelly of Greeley,

Mark H. Harrington of Denver, Lowell White of Denver
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and Dean Robert L. Stearns of the University of Colorado
Law School. Judge Orie L. Phillips, Judge of the Circuit
Court of Appeals in this district, will also give an address.
At a joint meeting of the sections on legal education and
admission to the bar and bar organization activities, Mr.
Kelly, the President-elect of the state association, will discuss
"Institutes for Smaller Local Bars from a Consumer's Point
of View." This joint meeting will be held in the Veterans'
Building on Wednesday, June 12th, at 2:00 o'clock. On the
following day, Judge Phillips will address the section on real
property, probate and trust law in the Veterans' Building,
on various phases of irrigation law.
One of the round-table discussions on insurance law will
be led by Mr. White on Tuesday at 10:30 o'clock, on the
question of the relation between death statutes and automobile guest statutes.
Mr. Harrington, as President of the Junior Bar Conference in Colorado, will lead a discussion on the formulation
of the program for the coming year for the conference, at 2:00
o'clock on Sunday, July 9th, at the Palace Hotel.
Dean Stearns is also scheduled to address one of the sections of the Association.
E. Gene Nikkel of Joes, Colorado, a graduate of the
University of Colorado Law School, 1938, has opened offices
for the practice of law in Fort Collins. He is located in the
Wilson Block, and is the fifth new lawyer within a year to
start the practice of law in that city.
The annual meeting of the Bar Association of the First
Judicial District was held in Central City on June 24th.
Among the guests were Governor Ralph L. Carr, Justice Benjamin Hilliard of the State Supreme Court and Mr. William
R. Kelly of Greeley, President-elect of the State Bar Association. This meeting, at which approximately sixty-five were
present, was the regular annual outing of the association.
Among the featured events was the customary horseshoe
pitching contest. Dinner that evening was held in the historic
old Teller House.
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Code Revision Committees Hold Weekly Meetings
The committees on the revision of the code in the State
of Colorado are now meeting weekly in the auditorium of
the Capitol Life Insurance Company at 16th and Sherman
Streets in Denver at 7:30 P. M. These meetings are-scheduled for each Monday night at 7:30 P. M. from June 26th
to September 18th, inclusive, and Phillip S. Van Cise of
Denver, general chairman, has urged that as many of the
committee as possible attend these weekly meetings. To date,
practically all of the committees have filed reports, indicating
progress on the code, and Group No. 4, relating to depositions
and discovery, has virtually completed its work. So far,
federal laws 29 and 32 have been recommended for adoption
verbatim, and rules 26, 28, and 33 have been modified to a
minor extent and certain additions have been made to these
rules. A comprehensive report of the work to date will be
outlined in one of the succeeding issues by the general chairman.
Any persons having suggestions relating to code revision or procedure are urged to get in touch with Mr. Van
Cise as soon as possible.
TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS IN HOME RULE CITIES

UDGE ROBERT STEELE on June 26, 1939, quashed
an information filed against a hit and run driver under
the state law because the offense occurred within the city
and county of Denver. This decision is in line with the one
mentioned in the preceding issue of Dicta where Judge John
B. O'Rourke ruled similarly in People vs. Daniels, No. 1743,
in the District Court of La Plata County. Judge Steele, in
the case of People vs. Graham, No. 34452, held that the hitand-run provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act are inoperative
within home rule cities because they are a part of the regulation of traffic which has expressly been declared a matter of
local concern for home rule cities under Denver vs. Henry,
95 Colo. 582, and because they are provisions affecting the
welfare and safety of the inhabitant of Denver, the power
to regulate which under the charter rests in the city.
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Judge Floyd Miles on June 27, 1939, however, held
in the matter of the petition of Humphreys, No. A-24762
that the state could revoke an operator's license where all of
the offenses occurred within a home rule city. This ruling
was based upon the wording of Section 145 of the State
Motor Vehicle Act as amended in 1939 which gives the state
power to suspend a license for violation of traffic laws. Judge
Miles ruled that the word "laws" also included ordinances,
and hence the state department was invested with authority
regardless of where the offenses occurred.
ANNUAL CONVENTION
The Committee on Program and Arrangements, of
which William E. Hutton, Esq., is the Chairman, has announced that the next annual meeting of the Colorado Bar
Association will be held at the Broadmoor hotel, Colorado
Springs, September 22nd and 23rd. The agenda of this
session assure that it will be one of the most important sessions that the Colorado Bar Association has held. In attendance at the convention will be Charles A. Beardsley, President
of the American Bar Association, Justice Wiley Rutledge,
of the United States Court of Appeals, and others prominent
in the state and nation who will address the Assembly. The
complete program will be announced later.
COMMITTEE ON LAW BOOK PUBLICATIONS
Joseph D. Pender, Chairman, has issued a call to members of this Committee to attend a meeting at his office, 551
Equitable Building, Denver, at 10 A. M., Thursday, July
20th. A report to the State Association will be discussed
and drafted.
AMERICAN BAR CONVENTION
As this is written a large number of Colorado lawyers are
planning to attend the annual convention of the American
Bar Association, at San Francisco, July 10th to 15th. We
have in mind: G. Dexter Blount, President of the Colorado
Association; Wilbur F. Denious, L. Ward Bannister, Byron
Rogers, Charles Q. Queary, Lawell White, Fred Y. Holland,
William R. Kelly, of Greeley, Dean Robert L. Stearns and
Larry Demuth, of Boulder.

Supreme Court Decisions
OBLIGATION OF COUNTY TO FURNISH MEDICAL AID TO NON-RESIDENT; ESTOPPEL TO DENY AGREEMENT TO PAY DOCTOR-

APPEAL AND ERROR-Board of County Commissioners u. Des-

mond-No. 14570-Decided May 8, 1939-District Court of
Crowley County-Hon. French L. Taylor, Judge-Affirmed. IN
DEPARTMENT.

FACTS: Plaintiff, a physician, filed claim against county for
$264.50 for professional services rendered a non-resident indigent person. The claim was disallowed. The District Court directed a verdict
in favor of the physician. The physician treated the itinerant for the
emergency and amputated his limb and attended him almost daily for
nearly three months. He received no express authorization from the
County Commissioners to proceed with the case, but they knew about
the matter almost from the beginning and discussed the matter with the
doctor, but never notified him as to whether he should or should not
act. The county did pay the hospital and nurses' bills.
HELD:
1. Where the County Commissioners pass on an unverified claim, and no objection is made at the trial as to its form, it is
too late to raise the question in the appellate court for the first time.
2. The objection of the county commissioners to the effect that
the doctor failed to establish a contract for services is without merit
because Section 4 of Chapter 124, Vol. 4, 1935 C. S. A. placed a duty
upon the board of county comissioners to furnish medical aid in such
cases, and the county is estopped to say it did not authorize the services.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Burke concur.
ESTATES-CLAIMS FOR SUPPORT MONEY BASED UPON PREVIOUS
ORDER OF COURT IN DIVORCE CASE-INTEREST ON CLAIM-

COLLATERAL ATTACK OF DIVORCE DECREE-DEPOSITIONS-

LACHES-In re: Estate of Lowell u. Arnett-No. 14362-Decided May 8, 1939--County Court of Denuer-Hon. C. E. Kettering, Judge-Affirmed. IN DEPARTMENT.
HELD: 1. The Appellate Court will not disturb finding of Probate Court that fifth class claim should be allowed against estate where it
appears that District Court had previously entered order in favor of
claimant and against decedent, in a divorce action requiring decedent to
pay a sum not less than $400.00 per annum of education of minor child
until she reaches her majority. It was correct to include in the amount of
the claim as allowed, simple interest at the statutory rate.
2. The finding in a divorce decree, approved by both parties, that
the child was adopted is conclusive in this matter. It was not properly
subject to collateral attack.
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The statute concerning the method of having depositions sent
3.
by the officer before whom they were taken does not limit transportation
to the mails. While it would be better practice to mail them, in the
absence of fraud or other harm, it would not comport with justice to
order reversal of the case merely because the officer gave them to one of
the attorneys who brought them to Denver and sent them by messenger
to the clerk of the court.
4. " 'Exception to a deposition which is made strictly on technical
grounds should not be sustained in the absence of any showing of
prejudice.'
5.
The record does not justify the court of review in entertaining
the question of laches for the first time. Had it been raised at the hearing, the opposing party would have opportunity to offer explanatory
evidence.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard. Mr. Justice Young and
Mr. Justice Knous, concur.
CRIME-BURGLARY

WITH FORCE-INTENT-COMMON

LAW-EN-

TRAPMENT-JURY-PREJUDICIAL ERROR-Douglas B. Stowell,

plaintiff in error, v. The People of the State-of Colorado, defendant in error-No. 14557-Decided May 1, 1939-Error to the
District Court of Lincoln County-Hon. Irena S. Ingham, Judge
-- On Application for Supersedeas--Judgment Reversed. EN
BANC.
FACTS: 1. Stowell was convicted of burglary. The information
charged him with burglary with force, and the evidence was to the effect
that Stowell entered the warehouse by means of a key furnished him by
his employer railroad company, having the right so to do.
2. Evidence disclosed Stowell's age as 54, his record with employer for 33 years clear; that he was not well, had been drinking; that
he was taken for a ride by one almost a stranger to him, given more to
drink, brought to the warehouse where he made the entry and took away
articles for which he had no use; that the warehouse was surrounded at
the time by special officers of the employer.
3. The record showed that the jury had been out for about eight
hours without coming to an agreement, then interrogated by the court;
deliberated again and returned to the court after three hours for a
"third degree instruction," after which they returned to deliberate for
two hours and 45 minutes when they were recalled and again interrogated, and the court advised of a disagreement. Thereupon, the court
expressed a desire for a definite verdict if possible, and after five hours a
verdict of guilty was brought in.
1. The evidence was insufficient to charge statutory
HELD:
burglary with force. Stowell had right to enter warehouse when and in
manner he did; and his unlawful intent will not suffice to make the
offense.
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2. The statute being in derogation of common law must be construed strictly.
The circumstances of entering and taking the articles strongly
3.
suggest such an "entrapment" as would make the statute inapplicable.
4. In the light of the record the conclusion is inevitable that any
error was probably prejudicial.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. Justice Francis E. Bouck not
participating.
INDICTMENT-BILL OF PARTICULARS-STATUTORY CRIME-PUBLIC
FUNDS-PUBLIC OFFICER-EVIDENCE-----Sam Wright, plaintiff
in error, v. The People of the State of Colorado, defendant in error
-No. 14522-DecidedMay 1, 1939-Errorto the District Court
of Las Animas County-Hon. David L. Ralston, Judge--Judgment Reversed. EN BANC.
Indictment containing four counts similar in char1.
FACTS:
acter except as to dates and amounts. Wright was charged, convicted
and sentenced on three counts, which substantially charged him with
being a road foreman in district No. 3 of the county, and with wilfully,
unlawfully, corruptly and feloniously using, making way with and
secreting for his own use and benefit a certain sum of money which was
part of the funds or money of said county. All counts were predicated
on Sec. 262, Ch. 48, C. S. A. 1935, providing for the offense of embezzlement where an officer appointed or elected by virtue of the constitution of the state or any law thereof converts to his own use, etc., public funds or moneys.
2. A bill of particulars was furnished which, in effect, charged a
felonious presentation of a spurious voucher to the County Commissioners, as a just and true account, whereby Wright obtained the money.
3. Evidence showed that Wright, for convenience of his men,
would gather the vouchers and take them to county seat and cash them
for the men. These vouchers were not cashed with public funds, but
were purchased by various individuals, who in turn received payment
therefor.
1. The offense charged in the indictment and in the
HELD:
bill of particulars are entirely different; indictment charges a statutory
embezzlement, the bill of particulars shows the obtainment of money
and warrants by means of false pretenses.
2. A defendant can be tried only on the charge contained in the
indictment, and the bill of particulars is no part thereof, its purpose being merely to inform.
3. Since the record is devoid of evidence the defendant received
public funds of the county, and since he held none by virtue of his employment or office, the offense provided for in Sec. 262, Ch. 48, C. S. A.
1935 does not apply.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Francis E. Bouck not
participating.
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EJ ECTMENT-REAL

ESTATE-CONDITIONS-FRAUD--RELIANCE-

Davis, et al. v. Miller, et al.-No. 14435-Decided February 14,
1939-District Court of Moffat County-Hon. John R. Clark,
Judge--On Rehearing, Affirmed.
HELD:
1. An equitable title to real estate, coupled with a legal
right to possessio.n is sufficient to sustain an ejectment, as between the
parties.
2. Where D owned a contract to purchase certain land from
the Federal Land Bank, the fee owner, and D assigned the contract to
M for $1,340.00 with the understanding that in the event the Bank
disapproves the assignment, the money is to be returned, the approval
of the bank is a condition subsequent and not a condition precedent.
3.
Where under such assignment the assignor refuses to give
up possession of the property and offers to return the money, but the
assignee insists upon his rights under the assignment, the latter may
maintain an action in ejectment and for damages.
4. Where assignor seeks to avoid assignment on ground of fraud,
his contentions fail where it appears that he made an independent
investigation before the execution of the instrument, for he cannot be
heard to say that he relied upon assignee's alleged misrepresentations.
5.
" 'Where parties know that the legal effect of known facts is
uncertain and base their agreement on that assumption, it is clear that
a mistake of law does not affect the validity of their agreement.'
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. EN BANC.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-OLD AGE PENSION AMENDMENT-LIQUOR
LICENSE FEES-ALLOCATION OF FUNDS--City and County of
Denver v. People of State of Colorado-No. 14367-Decided
February 14, 1939-District Court of Denver-Hon. Henry S.

Lindsley, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:

Action by people to recover from the City and County

of Denver, 85%

of the license fees collected by the City as liquor

license fees, under chaps. 82 and 142, S. L. 1935, and to permit their

availability for the old age pension fund.
HELD: 1. Section 2 of the Old Age Pension Amendment, chap.
200, S. L. 1937, page 881, reading as follows:
"Section 2.
There is hereby set aside, allocated and
allotted to the Old Age Pension Fund sums and money as
follows: * * * (b) Beginning January 1, 1937, eighty-five
per cent of all net revenue accrued or accruing, received or
receivable from taxes of whatever kind upon all malt, vinous
or spirituous liquor, both intoxicating and nonintoxicating,
and license fees connected therewith," is constitutional.
2. Article V, Sec. 24, of the Colorado Constitution was not
intended to abolish the power of the legislature (a fortiori, the people)
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to enact measures which amend pre-existing legislation by implication
only.
3.
The taking of the license fees does not violate the due process
clause of the Colorado (Article II, Sec. 25) and the federal (14th
amendment) constitutions because, assuming for the moment that the
City has a property right in the license fees, it does not necessarily
follow that it may invoke the due process clause because the most
important rights retained by the people is their right to amend their
constitution in any manner they see fit, so long as such amendments
are not repugnant to the constitution of the United States.
4. The granting of licenses for the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors is an incident of the liquor traffic and is controllable
as such. Article XXII of the State Constitution applies to the whole
state and therefore the question of whether the control of the sale of
intoxicating liquors under Article XX ever was exclusively a matter of
local and municipal concern need not be determined.
5.
The contention of the City that it has some sort of a vested
right in the funds is of no avail for if the City is disseized, it is by the
law of the land. To the extent that chapters 82 and 142 (C. 89, 1935,
C.S.A.) conflict with the Old Age Pension Amendment, they must yield
to the constitution.
6. A vested interest on the ground of conditions once obtained
cannot be asserted against the proper exercise of the police power.
7. In this state, the right to sell liquor is only a privilege the
citizen may obtain under a license granted, and it is subject to recall.
The City, therefore, acquired no property right in the fees.
8. The amendment does not raise the question of ex post facto
law for the officials of the City are charged with notice of the provisions of the amendment, and it operated on all liquor license revenue
still existing and undisposed of, which, the law assumes, the City still
has.
9. The rule of statutory construction is " 'Thus, relative and
qualifying words and phrases, where no contrary intention appears,
will be construed to refer solely to the last antecedent with which they
are closely connected.'
10. Where the constitution speaks in plain language in reference
to'a particular matter, the courts have no right to place a different
meaning on the words employed, because the literal interpretation may
happen to be inconsistent with other parts of the instrument in relation
to other subjects.
11.
"There is no such halo surrounding the police power vested
in our municipalities, such as to render them immune from the highest
prerogative exercised by the people, and expressed in this constitutional
amendment."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Bock concurs specially.
Mr. Justice Young, Mr. Justice Knous and Mr. Justice Burke dissent.
EN BANC.
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DIVORCE-EVIDENCE-ALIMONY - PROPERTY RIGHTS - RIGHT OF
INNOCENT PARTY TO MOVE FOR DISMISSAL-PUBLIC POLICY-

Doty v. Doty-No. 14272-Decided February 14, 1939-District Court of Dener-Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge-Reversed-On Rehearing.
FACTS: Wife instituted action for separate maintenance. He
filed cross-complaint. At the trial, plaintiff, with consent of court,
changed prayer by asking for a divorce and alimony. The jury found
for plaintiff and against defendant and the interlocutory decree was
entered. The plaintiff asked for a hearing on the matter of alimony and
property rights, but the court refused the request stating that he would
determine the rights of the parties from the evidence already adduced.
After entry of interlocutory decree, and long before expiration of six
months period (within which the parties were not divorced) plaintiff
moved to dismiss her case. This was refused.
HELD:
1. The court erred in refusing plaintiff's request after
the verdict of the jury in her favor, that she be permitted to introduce
evidence on the question of a property settlement and alimony. The
determination of property rights and alimony to be paid, if any, is a
matter for the court only, and there is no indication that that testimony
introduced, incidentally, before the jury was all the plaintiff could produce.
2. A court may not refuse the innocent party the right to dismiss
the case before the divorce becomes final, for to do so would compel
the innocent party to be divorced against her will. A married person
who has legal grounds for divorce is not bound to assert the same in the
courts.

3.
The public policy of this state, as declared by the legislature,
requires the marital status to be determined within a year, and such a
mandate is as definitely carried out by the dismissal of the action as by
the final dissolution of the marriage ties.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Knous concurs in part.
Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Bakke dissent. EN BANC.
WITNESSES-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-WAIVER HOSPITAL
RECORDSCONFLICT OF LAWS-Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, et al., v. Kaufman and Belsky-No. 14406-Decided
February 20, 1939-District Court of the City and County of
Denver-Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. "Privileged communications are personal to the patient only."
2.
"When the patient permits or consents without objection, that
the confidential information become public at a public trial, the reason

for the privilege ceases to exist."
3. The law of the forum (Missouri) holds that a waiver of
privilege established through testimony of one physician extends to
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all who have attended the patient for the same ailment regardless of
the time of such consultations, attendance or treatments.
4. Having waived the privilege in the trial of the first case, between the same parties, as to the same ailment, the patient cannot withdraw the waiver in subsequent cases. In Missouri when a waiver of
privilege is once made, it is general and not special.
5.
Under such circumstances, the trial court should order the
doctor in charge of the hospital records in Denver to appear before it
and instruct him to give his evidence under the dedimus as issued out of
the trial court in Missouri.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. EN BANC.
TAX DEEDs-Fort, et al., v. Genereaux-No. 14366-Decided February 20, 1939-District Court of Logan County. Hon. H. E.
Munson, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. A tax deed is not invalidated by its failure to disclose
the day on which the land was first offered for sale.
2. Where tax deed recites that the County, "by and through its
County Treasurer * * * did duly assign" to the purchaser the certificate
of sale, such recital is in conformity with Sec. 257, Chapter 142, 1935
C. S. A.
3.
Admissions made in open court by counsel for appellants preclude the contention that the deed does not show date of assignment by
County Treasurer.
4. A recital in the deed that "Genereaux has paid subsequent
taxes on said property to the amount of" $80.00 is in the form provided
by Section 257, supra, and is sufficient to establish, prima facie, at least,
that all subsequent taxes were paid by the purchaser of the certificate.
5. Where husband holds the record title to the land, the joint
possession thereof by husband and wife, is, in law, the possession of
the husband, although the wife filed a statutory homestead exemption
on the land. Under such circumstances, the wife is not such a "person
in actual possession or occupancy of such land" as to make the tax deed
void because the County Treasurer failed to serve her with the preliminary notice required by Section 255, Chapter 142, 1935 C. S. A.
6. The statute (sec. 255, supra), concerning notice of proposed
issuance of the tax deed, contemplates that service of the notice is complete when the County Treasurer registers and deposits in the United
States mails the statutory notice directed to the proper post office address
of the party to be notified. It is satisfactory if the notice is so deposited
"not more than five months, and at least three months before the time
of issuance of such deed," although the addressee does not receive the
notice until such a late date as to leave less than three months before
the issuance of the deed.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Young concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
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DEPENDENT CHILDREN-COMITY BETWEEN STATES-HABEAS COR-

PUS-PLEADING--The People of the State of Colorado; Rudolph

Kohler and Ruth Kohler, Parents and Foster Parents and next
friend of Juanita William, age 12; Geraldine William, age 8; and
Charlotte Kohler, age 4, plaintiffs in error, v. Hon. Eugene J.
Madden, Jr., Judge of the Juvenile Court and The Childrens Detention Home, defendants in error-No. 14544-Decided May 1,
1939-Errorto the District Court of City and County of Denver
-Hon. Joseph J. Walsh, Judge-On application for Supersedeas
-- Judgment Affirmed.

IN.DEPARTMENT.

FACTS:
1. Mother and foster father of children in question
brought habeas corpus proceedings to secure their custody. In 1936 said
minors had been declared dependent children and committed to the State
Home for Dependent and Neglected Children as wards of the State of
Colorado. Such judgment was not modified and no writ of error ever
prosecuted to review same.
2. The authorities of the state home placed said children for trial
adoption with citizens in the State of Kansas, which is alleged in the
petition, and it is further alleged that in said state the herein petitioners
obtained the legal care and custody of said children, after which they
returned with the children to Colorado, where juvenile officers took
them and returned them to the institution. Judgment for respondents
on the pleadings.
HELD:
1. In the absence of allegations that a judgment was
entered by a designated court with the names of the parties, and the date
of entry, comity cannot be recognized.
2. Where reliance is upon the judgment of a court of a foreign
state, as res judicata, it is necessary, in addition, to allege the jurisdiction
of the court.
3.
Decree in Kansas would have no effect extra-territorially without the confines of Kansas, where children become wards in Colorado.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Burke and Mr. Justice
Young concur.
DIVORCE-PROPERTY-ORDERS OF COURT As TO FUNDS-Henderson

v. Henderson--No. 14257-Decided May 1, 1939-District
Court of Weld County-Hon. Claude C. Coffin, Judge-Reversed.
IN DEPARTMENT.
FACTS: Wife brought suit for divorce, charging cruelty. The
husband, by cross-complaint, charged cruelty and adultery. The jury
found that the wife was guilty of cruelty to the husband. The wife's
motion for new trial on the ground that the evidence did not warrant
the jury's finding was denied. The court made certain orders relative
to the disposition of property and payment of money. Both parties
assign error.
HELD:
I. Where it appears that wife and husband are each of
considerable means, and the wife exercises unlawful control of husband's
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funds by placing them in a safety deposit box in her daughter's name,
the court erred in entering an order that the balance of the funds shall
continue in the safety deposit box, but that the wife "shall at all times
keep intact at least $7500.00 of said funds in said safety box." "Considering the property holdings of the husband and his ability to respond
to whatever further orders there might be, any impounding seems to
have been unnecessary; but if doubt existed in that regard we think
the court should have exercised judicial control of the fund."
2. "It may be the wife never should have had an interest in the
farm, * * * but inasmuch as the husband deeded it to her in their adjustment of an earlier divorce suit, we think he was not entitled to have
it restored out of hand."
3. There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in awarding the wife furniture purchased by the husband and an automobile;
although if the supreme court were entering the order in the first instance, it would not have so ordered.
4. The Supreme Court disapproves of the order of the trial court
awarding the entire property to the wife, in an instance where each bad
an investment of $1250.00 and they owned the property in joint
tenancy.
5.
"Considering that the wife was abundantly able to finance her
suit for divorce and to support herself during its pendency and disposition, we regard the preliminary order requiring the husband to pay her
$2000.00 for that purpose, or any sum, as unjust and violative of the
precedents."
6. The fact that the wife precipitated the litigation is not without
importance.
7. The wife and husband's employee took husband's livestock
holdings to their own use. He brought an action in conversion against
the wife and the employee. The trial court erred in requiring husband to
assign his right in the action to the wife or pay her $500.00 with which
to finance her defense.
8. The trial court based its orders against the husband in part
on the fact that in addition to alleging cruelty by the wife, he charged
her with adultery, and that the jury only sustained the former. The
husband's charges could have no bearing on the wife's claim for alimony.
Her right, in that regard, depended upon the result of her charges against
the husband.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard. Mr. Justice Young and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
CRIMINAL LAW - LARCENY
ACCESSORY EVIDENCE-INSTRUCTIONS--Bacino v. People-No. 14456-Decided April 17, 1939
-District Court of El PasoCounty-Hon. John M. Meiktle, Judge
-

-Affirmed.

EN BANC.

FACTS: Defendant tried as an accessory made a principal under
Section 13, Chapter 48, 1935 C. S. A., and was convicted of larceny of
a number of diamond rings.
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HELD: 1. "While as a general rule evidence tending to show
that accused has committed a crime wholly independent of the offense
for which he is on trial is inadmissible, there is an exception, equally well
settled, that it is competent to show that defendant had participated in
similar illegal enterprises to prove criminal intent, plan or design, and
especially in this case where, as here, the other transactions were so connected in point of time and so similar in character that the same motive
could be imputed as to all of them."
2. The trial court by proper instruction expressly limited the
consideration of the evidence of similar illegal enterprises, to the purpose
for which it was introduced, and no error was committed in admitting
such evidence.
3. It is permissible for a state's witness to corroborate his own
testimony by stating that he made prior statements consistent therewith.
This is a different situation from that where the alleged consistent statements came from other witnesses or was in the form of documentary evidence and not the oral statements of the witness whose testimony thereby was said to be fortified.
4. It is not error for the court to admit statement of witness that
she "told the officers of the transaction," since she did not testify what
she told them.
5.
While in itself, as a general proposition, the circumstance that
the court excluded similar evidence may not justify the admission of that
which was improper, it may mitigate the transgression; and in this case,
without deciding the question of admissibility of the evidence, it is clear
that the defendant was not prejudiced by the introduction of the evidence, to an extent which would warrant a reversal of the judgment.
6. It is proper to charge an accessory as a principal and it is permissible for the trial court to give an instruction which was designed
to inform the jury regarding the criminal responsibility of the persons
engaged ih the concerted common purpose of committing a felony.
7. Where one is an accessory, he must of necessity act in concert
with some other or others and whether charged jointly or separately
the legal consequences arising from his conduct and that of his associates
are measured by the same principle.
8. It is not necessary that agreement between accessory and principal to commit the offense be proved by the words or the writing of
same, but the agreement may be established by inference from other
established facts and circumstances.
9. Evidence and instructions examined, and found to be free
of error.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Bouck not participating.

DICTA

237

v. RobertsonNo. 14265-Decided April 17, 1939-District Court of Denver
-Hon. Joseph J. Walsh, Judge-Reversed. EN BANC.
1. Where four men agree to commence a joint business
HELD:
venture; and where it appears that before the adventure was a month old.
one of the four began, not to further its interest, but to work against it
by selling a competing line of merchandise; and where it appears that he
removed all of his money from the company's treasury as socn as possible after his abandonment of the adventure, and at a time when it was
sorely in need of funds; and where he had no agreement as to what he
should receive from his co-adventurers upon his leaving them against
their wishes; and where it appears that he refused individually to bear
any burden of the unconsummated adventure, he in legal effect disclaimed
any interest in the possible profits.
2. The finding of the trial court that there were oral contracts,
between the adventurer who withdrew and those who remained, being
unsupported by any evidence cannot stand.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bouck, Mr. Justice
Burke and Mr. Justice Bock not participating.
CONTRACTS-JOINT ADVENTURE-Highland Sales Co.

PUBLIC REVENUE-STATE INCOME TAX DIVERSION BILL-People,

etc. v. Armstrong, et al., People, etc. v. Bedford, et al.-Nos. 14563
and 14564-Decided April 27, 1939-Original ProceedingsPetitions for Writs of Mandamus-Alternative Writs Made Peremptory. EN BANC.
FACTS:
Separate applications for alternative writs of mandamus
directed against the state treasurer and state auditor, were filed, invoking
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and praying that the respondents in their respective official capacities be required to issue and
pay certain warrants or show cause. The respondents filed demurrers to
the alternative writs.
The petitions allege, and the demurrers admit, that the revenue
specifically allocated to the general fund of the state for the payment of
the first and second class appropriations of the Thirty-first General Assembly will be sufficient to pay in full only the first class appropriat ions
by the close of the fiscal period ending June 30, 1939, for which they
were made; and that because of a partial failure of the forms of taxation
and sources of revenue so allocated to the general fund to produce the
amount of money anticipated, it has developed that appropriations of the
second class for the said fiscal period cannot be paid unless previous to the
expiration of the period, the general fund is augmented by additional
revenue or resources.
To meet this emergent contingency, the Thirty-second General
Assembly passed House Bill No. 122, which became effective, by its
terms, from and after March 31, 1939. It purported to allocate a specified percentage of certain proceeds of the state income tax for the years
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1938, 1939 and 1940 to the "Reserve for General Fund of the State"
for transfer to the general fund, by the machinery therein provided, for
the payment of the first and second class appropriations of the 31st General Assembly and for the payment of appropriations of the 32nd
General Assembly.
The Governor, in accordance with the provisions of the bill,
executed his voucher and approved for payment certain expenditures out
of the "Reserve for General Fund of the State." The treasurer refused
to draw the warrant for the transfer and auditor further refused to draw
the specific warrants with which the petitions are concerned on the
general fund; and so these proceedings;
HELD:
1. Those who seek to overthrow a statute on the ground
of its repugnance to a constitutional provision must show the unconstitutionality of the act beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. It is true that when the entire revenue of a given fiscal year
has been exhausted the legislative appropriations for that year remaining unpaid, or any unpaid portions thereof, are totally void, constitute no
debt and impose no obligation, legal or moral, upon the people or upon
any future general assembly.
3. But, this void status may not be declared until the total
revenues for the fiscal year involved properly shall have been applied
to the payment of said appropriations, and only after this process is
entirely complete do any of such appropriations or any portion thereof
become finally void.
4. No matter how dire the estimate or dark the forecast as to
revenue for any fiscal year, no appropriation for that period can be declared void for deficiency of revenue previous to the expiration of that
fiscal year. (June 30, 1939).
5. The purpose of Section 16, Article X, Colorado Constitution,
is to prohibit the making of appropriations authorizing expenditures for
any fiscal year in excess of the revenue provided for the payment thereof
during said period, to the end that indebtedness beyond the current means
of discharging the same may be precluded.
6. The inhibition applies only to the fiscal year and not to the
general assembly which may chance to be in session at that time.
7. Within the same fiscal year, the power of the 31st and 32nd
General Assemblies, with relation to providing revenue within constitutional bounds for appropriations of that fiscal year, would be coextensive.
8. The 1938 income tax becomes due and payable prior to June
30, 1939, and the proceeds of such tax become revenue for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1939, although the law extends, to the taxpayer, the
privilege of paying in installments, the last one of which must be made
by a date subsequent to June 30, 1939, and such tax, under House Bill
No. 1220may be applied to the first and second class appropriations for
that period, without reference to whether the actual payment is made
upon the due date, by subsequent installments, or otherwise.
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9. No part of the 1939 or 1940 tax lawfully could be used to
meet appropriations for the fiscal year expiring June 30, 1939.
10. The circumstance that the proceeds for all three years are
allotted to the same fund in no way mitigates against the validity of
the bill, since the disbursing officers of the state can apply the revenues
of the different fiscal periods to the appropriations therefore as in ordinary cases.
11.
House Bill No. 122 is the exact antithesis of an appropriation
bill, since it puts money into the state treasury, instead of taking it out;
and therefore is not in violation of Sections 24, 31 and 32 of Article V
of the State Constitution. The bill is one for the allocation of Revenue.
12. An appropriation made for the care and relief of destitute,
unemployed and unemployable citizens of the state falls in the same
classification as appropriations made for institutions such as the "penitentiary, insane asylum, industrial school, * * *, and appropriations for
charitable institutions * * *."
13. Though in a strict sense of the word, the statute defining
second class appropriations imply a use by institutions, if the destitute,
unemployed, and unemployables are not provided for they would, inevitably and of necessity, have to be cared for in one or more of the
established charitable or eleemosynary institutions of the state.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous.

INSURANCE- RECEIVERSHIP - CONTRACTS - TRUST FUND-California Service, Inc. v. People, etc.-No. 14360-Decided March
6, 1939-District Court of Dener-Hon. Stanley H. Johnson,
Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Review requested of an order in a liquidating receivership of an insurance company, in which plaintiff asked Court for an
order requiring liquidating receiver to surrender to it a certain sum,
together with interest, and that the same be declared to be a trust fund
and the sole property of plaintiff. Trial court held the amount was not
a trust fund, and that plaintiff was merely a general creditor.
HELD:
1. Where A, who is an authorized insurer, agrees with
B that the latter may conduct an insurance business in the name of A,
providing it pays A a certain percentage of the premiums and sets up
a fund protecting A against unearned premiums and any claims on the
policies, it seems to be a method by which B can engage in the insurance
business in a separate compartment without being authorized by law
and without being subject to any regulatory power.
2. The validity of such agreement is not seriously questioned, if
it is so construed that it is not a fraud upon general creditors and
policy holders.
3.
The funds sought to be impressed with a trust became the
assets of the insurance company and a part of the reserve liability, not
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only as to the insurance written under the agreement, which was solely
accident and health, but also as to any other policy holders having
claims against the company.
4. The court considers as lending weight to the conclusion, the
fact that interest was paid by the insurance company to the plaintiff
for the use of the cash which was carried as an asset in the general
account of the insurance company.
5. Since the cash was to go to the company as a part of its
reserve, then, of course, title passed, and no title could revert to the
plaintiff until at least the liabilities under the policies sold by it had been
satisfied.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Bouck, dissent. EN BANC.
QUIET TITLE-OIL AND GAS LEASE-ABANDONMENT-Hoff v.
Girdler Corp.-No. 14512-Decided March 6, 1939--District
Court of Las Animas County-Hon. John L. East, JudgeAffirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff, owner of land, gave to defendant gas and oil
lease providing that the lease shall continue for five years and as long
thereafter as oil or gas, or either of them, is produced from the land
by the lessee. The latter spent nearly $500,000.00 to obtain and continue the production of helium gas. Its contract with the United States
Government to furnish it the gas was cancelled and no other commercial
market for the gas was available. The lessee during the interim, has
kept up and maintained its pipe lines, plant and facilities, to the end
that immediate production can be resumed in the event a market for
the gas becomes available. The plaintiff contends that defendant has
abandoned the lease and seeks to quiet the title in himself.
1. When a producing gas well has been developed
HELD:
within the primary term of the lease but the product has not been
marketed, that fact alone does not authorize the lessor to declare an
abandonment of the lease unless the failure to market has been continued for an unreasonably long period of time.
2. Abandonment can only be declared by showing intention, and
while intention may be shown by circumstantial evidence, no such
evidence appears here.
The underlying principle is to the effect that abandonment
3.
must be accomplished by the voluntary act of the lessee, decisive of a
relinquishment of the right to be abandoned and inconsistent with
future ownership or control thereof.
4. Where, as here, the conditions which forced cessation of
operations were created by events beyond the control of the lessee and
involuntary to it, and the facts show a course of conduct by the lessee
inconsistent with intent to abandon, no abandonment will be declared.
5. The judgment, however, in so far as it presently quiets title

DICTA
to the lease of the premises in the lessee, should not have the
conclusively establishing this status in perpetuity, but must
sidered as being without prejudice to later consideration if future
ments warrant.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous.
Mr. Justice Bock
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EN BANC.
CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT IN DEEDS-REAL ESTATE-LIQUOR RESTRICTIONS-Union Colony Co. v. Gallie, etc.-No. 14443-

Decided March 6, 1939-District Court of Weld County-Hon.
Frederic W. Clark, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:
Plaintiff purchased property from U. C. Company at a
time when there was a condition declaring forfeiture in event of violation of liquor restrictions. The U. C. Company's charter expired in
1929. In 1934 another company under same name was organized
and assumed the right to succeed to any and every property right of the
old company. Just after the organization of the new company, the two
surviving members of the last board of trustees of the old company, by
deed, conveyed to the new company, all of the assets of the old company
held by them by virtue of the trust imposed on them by section 62,
chapter 41, C. S. A. 1935. The plaintiff instituted a request for
declaratory judgment seeking to have the court hold that the defendants
had no right of re-entry and no right to forfeit plaintiff's title in event
of the breach of the condition. The court so held when it overruled
defendant's demurrer.
HELD:
1. The condition in the deed from the old company
through which plaintiff deraigns her title is a condition subsequent and
upon breach it is conceded would have entitled the old company, during
its corporate existence, to declare a forfeiture and to re-enter the
property.
2. Conditions subsequent are not favored by the law, and are construed strictly because they tend to destroy estates.
3. Under the common law, which is in force in Colorado, in
this instance, the right of re-entry for condition broken, sometimes
described as a possibility of reverter, could not be assigned.
4. The condition subsequent reserved by the old company, creating a possibility of re-entry upon breach, sometimes called a power of
termination, does not constitute an estate in the grantor, and may be
defeated by statutory enactment.
5.
It is settled law that no one can take advantage of the nonperformance of a condition subsequent annexed to an estate in fee but
the grantor or his heirs, or the successors of the grantor if the grant
proceed from an artificial person; and if they do not see fit to assert their
right to enforce a forfeiture on that ground, the title remains unimpaired
in the grantee.
6. If the trustees of old company had the right to declare forfeiture, they have destroyed it by conveyance to the new compiny
which could not take it because there is no statutory power allowing
such assignment or transfer.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.

242

DICTA

SURETIES--SUIT TO RECOVER PAYMENT MADE ON FORFEITURE OF
BOND--VanGilder v. City and County of Denver-No. 14297Decided March 13, 1939-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. Joseph
J. Walsh, Judge-Affirmed.
Plaintiff, a surety, brought suit to recover the amount
FACTS:
paid on a forfeited criminal recognizance. C was charged with a crime
and plaintiff signed his bond as surety. While a jury was being selected
for his trial, C disappeared. The bond was forfeited, scire facias issued,
and judgment was entered against plaintiff, as surety, for $10,000.00,
which was paid. Later C was apprehended, returned to Denver and
surrendered by plaintiff to the sheriff in open court. Thirty days
later C was surrendered on extradition, to Illinois which tried and
convicted him and committed C to the Illinois penitentiary. Colorado
then asked Illinois to hold C for it on his release from prison.
1. The right of sureties to obtain their discharge and
HELD:
exoneration from a forfeited recognizance is statutory, and Section 444,
Chapter 48, Vol. 2, 1935 C. S. A. covers the situation.
2.
Considering the equities of the case, the application for relief
should be prompt, while the evidence is fresh. (Here 14 years elapsed.)
3.
The state can only be estopped by the conduct of its officers
"in respect of acts done in its so-called proprietary or private capacity,
as distinguished from its so-called governmental or public capacity in
the strict scope of which it cannot be estopped." Here its actions were
in governmental capacity.
4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit recovery.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bakke concur. IN DEPARTMENT.

SCHOOL DISTRICT-TEACHERS-DISCHARGE-BOARD--HEARINGSMary K. Ruger, plaintiff in error, v. Stephen J. Knight, Carl P.
Schwalb, Samuel Johnson, William C. Sterne, L. Kent Robinson,
Dorothy Kunsmiller, and Frank M. Vaughn, as members of and
constituting the Board of Education of School District No. 1, City
and County of Denver, State of Colorado--No. 14299-Decided
March 6, 1939-Error to the District Court of the City and
County of Denver-Hon. Charles C. Sackmann, Judge.
1. Ruger brought mandamus to compel reinstatement
FACTS:
as a school teacher, and demanded damages. Answer to amended
alternative writ set up three defenses, a demurrer to which was overruled. At close of her evidence, on motion for non-suit, judgment
entered against Ruger.
2.
In June, 1935, plaintiff was requested to resign, and on her
refusal she was advised that board had already decided on her discharge. On July 12, in an attempt to comply with Roe v. Hannigan,
97 Colo. 113; 47 Pac. (2) 403, complaint was filed with the board
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charging Ruger with inefficiency, incompetency and dissatisfaction with
conduct of classes, and after due notice, hearing was held and charges
sustained.
3. Ruger contended that hearing was a sham; that evidence adduced, and evidence proffered, but rejected, would show an agreement
with Superintendent and board that his recommendation of discharge
would be complied with, regardless of facts; that discharge was thus
predetermined.
HELD:
1. Entire lack of evidence to support contention; it
rests solely upon inference and agreement.
2. Categorical and unequivocal denials in board's answer made
overruling of demurrer correct.
3. Members of board called for cross-examination under statutes
testified that no agreement existed with Superintendent; that cases
were disposed of on merits; that no consideration was given to attempted
discharge; that hearing was full, fair and impartial, and decision based
on evidence. Motion for non-suit, based on such evidence, was proper.
4. Offers of evidence relating to cases of other teachers, unconnected with instant case, made prior to Roe case, were properly rejected
as immaterial.
5. Absent evidence of the truth or falsity of the charges before
the board, and the evidence adduced thereat, the presumption from the
record is that the evidence admitted of no conclusion other than that
which the board reached.
6. If discretion was exercised, the courts have nothing to do with
the result of the hearing, unless gross abuse appears; no abuse of discretion being in question, lower court properly concluded discretion was
exercised.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bakke.
DIVORCE

-

SEPARATION AGREEMENTS -

MERGER IN DECREES

MODIFICATIONS, EFFECT THEREOF--Jessie M. GaL'ette, plaintiff
in error, U. Joseph A. Gavette, defendant in error-No. 14375Decided February 27, 1939-District Court of the City and
County of Denver-Hon. Robert W.

Steele, Judge-Judgment

Affirmed.
FACTS:
I. Plaintiff in error sought specific enforcement of a
separate maintenance agreement under Section 29, Ch. 56, Vol. 2, 1935
C. S. A. After demurrer to amended complaint was overruled, answer
and replication' were filed, following which, a motion for judgment
on pleadings and to dismiss the action was sustained.
2. The agreement provided for the payment of $150.00 per
month for the support of the wife and the daughter of the parties
until July, 1938, at which time said daughter would be 18 years of age,
and at which time on petition of the husband the terms thereof were
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reformable to work justice to the parties. This agreement was entered
as a part of the findings of fact and conclusion of law of the court in the
divorce action.
3.
Subsequently, the amount was reduced by the court to
$100.00 at the request of the defendant in error, and later increased
to $112.50 at the request of the plaintiff in error. It is sought to recover
the difference between the amount plaintiff would be entitled to under
the agreement and the amount she received under the orders modifying
it.
HELD:
1. Having availed themselves of the good offices of the
court to fix the amount of alimony from time to time, it must be
assumed that they submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court
for the entry of such orders as it deemed just and fair.
2. A request that an executed agreement be made part of the
interlocutory and final decrees of divorce merged the agreement into the
judgment and destroyed its separate identity. Besides the interlocutory
decree embracing the contract provided for modifications.
3. Incorporation of the agreement in the final decree barred an
independent suit thereon.
4. Titus v. Titus, 96 Colo. 191, 41 Pac. 244, distinguished by
reason of contract in that case not being incorporated in decrees.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice
Burke concur. IN DEPARTMENT.

EQUITY - SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE - PLEADING - STATUTE OF
FRAUDS-REAL ESTATE-Zamboni, et al. v. Graham, et al.-No.

14500-Decided February 27, 1939-District Court of Grand
County-Hon. Charles E. Herrick, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD: 1. "Ordinarily, of course, equity will not decree specific
performance of a contract where it is so indefinite and uncertain as to
be incapable of being specifically enforced, but this rule does not deprive
a court of the power and duty to effect an equitable adjustment between
the litigants when it is admitted that both parties have some rights in
the subject of the controversy."
2. Where it is obvious to the court that money damages would
be insufficient to compensate one for what he had built into, and what
the other party acknowledges to be, his home, the court will decree
specific performance giving plaintiff right of ownership in land upon
which home is built upon payment for land.
3. Complaint examined and found, that, while it does not allege
that plaintiff has "no speedy and adequate remedy at law," it satisfies
the code requirements as to pleading. 21 C. J. 387.
4. Where it appears that one seeking specific performance of unwritten contract to sell land, has expended from $1,200 to $1,500
in labor and materials in building his home on land in reliance on
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seller's (defendant's) consent, it is apparent that there was sufficient
part performance to overcome the defense of the Statute of Frauds.
5. The price for land set by the trial court ($100.00 per acre) is
reasonable under all the circumstances, and the decree of the court in
awarding 1.9 acres out of a total of 156 acres does not "break up the
land too badly."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Burke concur. IN DEPARTMENT.
FIRE INSURANCE CONTRACT-ARSON-North River Insurance Com-

pany v. Militello-No. 14516-Decided February 27, 1939District Court of Las Animas County-Hon. David M. Ralston,
Judge-Affirmed.
HELD:
1. The conviction of the policy holder of burning the
insured property is prima facie evidence of the facts involved, in a civil
suit to recover on the policy. (Following Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co.,
258 N. Y. 310, 179 N. E. 711).
2. Where it appears in such civil suit that the insurance company had its own way with requested instructions, which are liberally
in the company's favor, and no objection is made to any of the testimony of plaintiff in which he detailed his version of circumstances concerning the fire, and which he denied starting, and the jury brings in a
verdict for plaintiff, it is apparent that the jury believed the plaintiff's
story and the verdict will not be set aside.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Knous, Mr. Justice
Bock, Mr. Justice Burke concur in conclusion only. Mr. Justice Bouck
specially concurs. EN BANC.
COLORADO UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT EMPLOYMENT
-WORDS
AND PHRASES-POLICE POWER-CONSTRUCTION OF

STATUTES-Industrial Commission v. Northwestern Mutual Life
Insurance Company-No. 14359-Deided February 14, 1939District Court of Denver-Hon. Robert W. Steele, Judge-Reversed.
HELD: 1. Life insurance companies employing general agents,
district agents, special and soliciting agents, full or part time, to sell
insurance, collect premiums, service policies, and to perform the necessary services incidental to any of such activities are required to make
contributions under the Colorado Unemployment Compensation Act
(S. L. 1936, 3d Ex. Sess., c. 2, 1935, C. S. A., 1937, Supp. C. 167A).
2. This is so although the contract of employment contains a
clause against construing it in such a manner as would create a master
and servant relationship.
3. "Employment" construed under the definition stated in the
act. "The statutory definition sets forth three conditions, and they are
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in the conjunctive. A showing of conformity with all three, to the satisfaction of the commission, is a prerequisite to exemption from coverage
under the law."
4. The legal basis of the act is the police power of the state.
"Its purpose is to assure a measure of security against the great hazard
of unemployment in our economic life."
Insurance companies are included in the act as "employing
5.
units."
6. "Commissions" are included in the term "wages," and it is
of no avail to the insurance company that its agents receive "commissions."
7. The intention' of the legislature to have the act cover "individuals," regardless of whether or not they are employees or individual
contractors, cannot be doubted.
8. The legislature has the power to define terms used by it and
the statutory definitions control judicial interpretation.
9. Evidence of contract relationship between insurance company
and agent examined and found to give general control of employment
to company, thereby eliminating the possibility of having the relationship come within the statutory exemption.
10. The important thing under the contract of relationship between insurance company and its agent is not what the contract calls
the relationship but what the relationship actually is as determined from
the duties, control, etc.
There is not such a similarity between the state and federal
11.
unemployment compensation acts as to require the Supreme Court to
make the latter, and authorities construing it, a controlling factor in the
interpretation of the state act.
12. The state act is not to be construed as including other exemptions than those expressly mentioned, unless the legislative intent to
do so clearly appears.
13. The federal act permits a wide variation of the provisions of
state unemployment compensation laws, and no uniformity of coverage
is required. "* * * The Colorado act has a sufficiently independent
basis, and * * * the federal act does not place any limitations upon our
interpretation or the guide of interpretation contained in the act itself,
as it relates to the issue here."
14. The practical difficulties suggested by the insurance company
that make it impossible to administer the act successfully, where it is
concerned, are more theoretical than real. "Courts cannot weigh the
consequences of the exercise of legislative power, at least not in advance
of specific action."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bock. Mr. Justice Burke dissents.
EN BANC.
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Industrial Commission v. DiNardi,
et al.-No. 14501-Decided February 14, 1939-DistrictCourt
of Fremont County-Hon. James L. Cooper, Judge-Affirmed.
Held:
1. In a Workmen's Compensation case, while courts
are without authority to substitute their conclusions, upon the evidence
adduced, for those of the commission, nevertheless, where the findings
of fact of the commission are insufficient, the evidence given before the
referee may be by the court treated as findings of fact and considered
accordingly. The district court was, in this case, justified in ordering the
commission to enter the final award directed without remanding the
cause for more detailed findings.
2. Where a boy, 19, is taken out of school and put to work to
help the family pay previously contracted debts, with the intention
that he be returned to school at a later date, and where the father is
able to and does work, and they both support the family consisting
of themselves and the boy's mother and two minor brothers, and the
boy dies from a compensable injury, the mother and two brothers were
partially dependent upon decedent, and the trial court did not err in
making an award based upon such conclusion.
3. The question as to who constitute dependents and the extent
of their dependency is to be determined as of the date of the accident
to the employee.
4. It is no argument against dependency that the father, a few
months before the death of the boy, purchased a new automobile and
that payments were made thereon, presumably out of their joint earnings. This does not affect the status of the mother and brothers as
dependents. There is no showing that the ownership of such an automobile was inconsistent with the family's class and social position.
5. " 'In order for relatives to be -dependents of an unmarried
decedent they must be dependent in fact on his contributions in order
to continue to live in comfort according to the manner of living of
people in their class and condition of life.' "
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Young concur. IN DEPARTMENT.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

TAXATION-CHARITABLE USE-EXEMPTION--City Temple Institu-

tional Society v. McGuire, etc.-No. 14377-Decided February
20, 1939-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, JudgeAffirmed.
HELD:
1. Real property in the form of an apartment house
rented to private families for certain monthly rentals is not exempt from
taxation on the ground that all of the net proceeds from the rentals are
used exclusively for the support and maintenance of an average population of 25 dependent and homeless girls between the ages of 16 and
25, where the girls actually reside in other property.
2. The contention that the burden of the government is lessened
by the work of the Home is of no significance since it does not "occupy"
the property sought to be claimed as exempt.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Bock not participating.
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